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Copyright Misuse:  






Faced with a rapidly evolving technological landscape—one in 
which near-perfect copies of digital content can be created and 
disseminated with minimal cost and unprecedented ease—copyright 
owners have sought to exercise greater control over expressive 
works. In many cases, they have undertaken this task by harnessing 
the very same technological forces that threaten to disrupt their 
traditional business models:1 monitoring online activity and 
responding to potentially infringing uses with thousands of cease-
and-desist letters; licensing rather than selling digital works; or 
locking down content with technological access and control 
measures. These attempts at enhanced protection merit concern 
because their effectiveness is, for the most part, not limited by the 
scope of rights granted to copyright owners under the Copyright Act.2 
Unrestrained by copyright's statutory limits (including the restriction 
against copyrighting works in the public domain) and internal safety-
valves (such as fair dealing), content holders are now able to 
routinely overreach the boundaries of copyright law and abuse their 
limited statutory grant of rights in copyrighted works. This 
behaviour, which I refer to generally as “overreach and abuse,” can 
be classified into two broad categories.3 
                                                
*Martin Twigg is a J.D. student at Dalhousie University, Schulich School of Law. 
He will be clerking at the Supreme Court of British Columbia before beginning his 
articles at a large regional firm in Vancouver, B.C. 
 
1 See Sara Wei-Ming Chan, “Canadian Copyright Reform: 'User Rights' in the 
Digital Era” (2009) 67 UT Fac L Rev 235 (“[t]his phenomenon has allowed 
unprecedented access to copyrighted materials, hence engendering new forms of 
creativity and authorship. At the same time, these developments have provided 
rights holders with the technological tools to monitor and control the use of their 
works in ways previously unimagined” at 239). 
2 RSC 1985, c C-42. 
3 Any attempt at categorization is subject to a degree of arbitrariness and other 
approaches are equally valid. For instance, Peter Yu and John Cross identify four 
categories of abusive behaviour by copyright owners in U.S. and Canadian case 
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The first category includes protective measures that, although 
procedurally valid, cannot ultimately be substantiated in law. 
Labelled by commentators as “copyfraud,”4 these actions involve 
content holders increasingly laying claim to rights in expressive 
works that have little or no basis in copyright law. Backed by threats 
of litigation, these spurious claims often go uncontested due to the 
power imbalance existing between owner and user groups. The 
second category includes protective measures that are substantively 
legal, but entirely divorced from the statutory domain of copyright 
law. Contractual agreements—many of which are subject to 
considerable inequality of bargaining power—and an array of 
technological protection measures or “digital locks”—which can be 
further supported by anti-circumvention laws—are being employed 
with increasing frequency by content owners. The result is a 
comprehensive system of legally enforceable barriers to expressive 
works that often trump copyright law, the terms of which are set 
almost entirely by private entities. Taken together, these two 
categories of behaviour not only tip the balance in favour of content 
holders, rendering users' rights such as fair dealing largely 
ineffectual, but also threaten to marginalize the application and 
therefore relevancy of copyright law as a whole. Increasingly, 
copyright is being displaced by a comprehensive “privately defined 
rights regime.” 
 
In response to this trend, courts, copyright users and legal scholars 
have begun to look outside the statutory confines of copyright law in 
the hope of identifying legal tools capable of restoring a degree of 
balance to the regulation and control of expressive works.5 One 
avenue currently being pursued in the United States is the doctrine of 
copyright misuse, an equitable defence to copyright infringement 
that arises when a copyright owner has “misused” his or her 
copyright. Where the Copyright Act is silent or unable to prevent 
content holders from overstepping the bounds of copyright law, the 
doctrine of copyright misuse provides owners with an incentive to 
                                                
law. See John T Cross and Peter K Yu, “Competition Law and Copyright Misuse” 
(2008) 56 Drake L Rev 427 at 434-438. 
4 See Jason Mazzone, “Copyfraud” (2006) 81 NYU L Rev 1026 at 1028. 
5 Among the legal measures being explored to counteract the abusive behaviour of 
copyright owners are competition law, the doctrines of copyright misuse and 
unclean hands, abuse of process and tortious interference. See Cross and Yu, supra 
note 3 at 455-461. 
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respect the statutory limits of copyright, lest they risk losing the 
ability to enforce certain legal claims until the behaviour constituting 
misuse has been remedied. 
 
Although Canada is vulnerable to many of the same forces of 
overreach and abuse as the United States, no doctrine comparable to 
copyright misuse currently exists in Canadian law. This may simply 
be due to the relatively short history of copyright misuse in 
American jurisprudence, but is likely also attributable to a previous 
lack of a clearly articulated justification for the doctrine’s existence 
in Canada. However, the Supreme Court of Canada in a “trilogy” of 
copyright cases has recently filled that purposive vacuum.6 The 
notion of balance between dual objectives, the concept of users' 
rights and an increasingly economic and instrumentalist 
understanding of copyright law—all principles to emerge from the 
trilogy—provide strong support for a “made-in-Canada” approach to 
copyright misuse. Although unlikely to stem the tide of overreach 
and abuse completely, the doctrine would serve to uphold the 
statutory limits of copyright, helping to ensure the Copyright Act’s 
continuing role as the dominant means of regulating expressive 
works in Canada. 
 
This paper is divided into four parts. Part I canvasses the growing 
phenomenon of overreach and abuse by content holders. Two broad 
categories of behaviour are explored, revealing the need for a judicial 
doctrine capable of responding to the threats posed to copyright law 
as a result. Part II examines the American doctrine of copyright 
misuse as a tool to address instances of overreach and abuse. Its 
recent emergence from the related doctrine of patent misuse is 
discussed, along with its various doctrinal approaches and potential 
for future growth and expansion. Part III justifies the importation of 
the copyright misuse doctrine into Canadian law. The recent 
articulation of copyright's purpose by the Supreme Court of Canada 
is proposed as a justificatory basis for the doctrine's recognition, and 
                                                
6 See Daniel Gervais, “The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada” (2005) 2 UOLTJ 
315 (“[i]n three recent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada provided Canadian 
copyright law with something that had arguably been missing: a purpose” at 317); 
Théberge v Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34 [Théberge]; CCH 
Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 [CCH]; Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet 
Providers, 2004 SCC 45 [SOCAN]. 
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concerns relating to the viability of copyright misuse in Canada are 
also addressed. Part IV contains a brief conclusion. 
 
Part I: Identifying Overreach and Abuse 
 
a) “Copyfraud”: An intellectual property gold rush 
 
The first category of overreach and abuse concerns systematic 
attempts by content holders to assert rights in expressive works that 
are of questionable legal merit. Although the Copyright Act provides 
a variety of remedies to protect the rights of copyright owners, the 
statute is conspicuously silent on how owners may go about 
enforcing those rights.7 Since there is no mechanism within the Act to 
prevent individuals from asserting frivolous claims, copyright 
owners are incentivized to define their rights as broadly as possible, 
even laying claim to works in the public domain or to expression not 
eligible for copyright protection. This behaviour has been labelled by 
some critics as “copyfraud”: an attempt to exercise monopoly rights 
in an expressive work that has no basis in copyright law.8 
 
False copyright claims commonly arise in the form of cease-and-
desist letters. Threats of litigation can be used to stifle critical 
speech, leverage greater control in the marketplace9 and extract rents 
for unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work that are, in fact, fully 
permitted under the Act.10 While such behaviour is by no means new 
or even technically illegal, the increasingly aggressive protection of 
copyrights, made possible in part by recent changes in technology,11 
                                                
7 See Cross and Yu, supra note 3 (speaking in regards to both U.S. and Canadian 
copyright law at 455). 
8 See Mazzone, supra note 4 at 1028. 
9 See Jennifer M Urban & Laura Quilter, “Efficient Process or 'Chilling Effects'? 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act” 
(2005-2006) Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 621 at 687. 
10 See Mazzone, supra note 4 at 1026. 
11 Content holders regularly scour the Internet searching for potential infringing 
uses, sometimes sending huge volumes of cease-and-desist letters in response. See 
Victoria Smith Erkstrand, “Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of Copyright: 
Reconsidering Copyright Misuse” (2006) Comm L & Pol'y 565 (Erkstrand 
describes an “ever-growing population of 'copyright bullies'” who “send out 
thousands of cease and desist letters” at 566). Legal action en masse is often 
fraught with problems. See generally Urban and Quilter, supra note 9. 
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has led to a “systematic over-claiming of copyright.”12 The 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (a non-profit organization dedicated 
to protecting civil liberties on the Internet), in conjunction with a 
number of law schools, has been documenting these spurious claims 
through the joint project “Chilling Effects.”13 In a study of nearly 900 
cease-and-desist letters sent by copyright holders under notice and 
takedown provisions of the United States Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA),14 roughly a third were found to be deficient 
in some manner, mostly due to a questionable underlying copyright 
claim.15 
 
This overreaching behaviour is not limited to the online environment, 
but rather affects old and new media alike. Books and other 
publications regularly contain copyright notices warning against 
unauthorized reproduction in any form,16 even when the majority or 
all of its content exists in the public domain.17 Similar notices 
accompany broadcasts of sporting events on television18 and even the 
most casual of film viewers will be familiar with the FBI warnings 
on VHS tapes and DVDs threatening severe civil and criminal 
penalties for unauthorized copying.19 According to Judge Richard 
Posner, these expansive warnings are nothing more than “pure 
bluff,” laying claim to sweeping rights that cannot possibly be 
justified on such absolute terms, particularly in light of fair use laws 
in the United States (or, for that matter, fair dealing laws in 
                                                
12 See Richard Posner, “Fair Use and Misuse” (24 August, 2004), online: Lawrence 
Lessig's Blog <http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/002119.shtml>. 
13 See Chilling Effects <http://www.chillingeffects.org>. 
14 Pub L No 105-304, Title I, 112 Stat 2860 (1998) (17 USC). 
15 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 9 at 666. 
16 See William F Patry & Richard A Posner, “Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the 
Wake of Eldred” (2004) 92 Calif L Rev 1639 at 1655. 
17 See Mazzone, supra note 4 at 1028. 
18 The Computer & Communications Industry Association recently filed a 
complaint against a number of sports, entertainment and publishing companies, 
including the National Football League and Major League Baseball, before the 
Federal Trade Commission alleging that such warnings were misrepresentative of 
copyright law and constituted deceptive and unfair trade practices. For an excellent 
account of the dispute, see Cory Tadlock, “Copyright Misuse, Fair Use, and 
Abuse: How Sports and Media Company are Overreaching Their Copyright 
Protections” (2008) J Marshall Rev Intell Prop L 621. 
19 Ibid at 621. 
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Canada).20 Yet the mere threat of litigation, no matter how weak the 
underlying copyright claim, often yields highly effective results.21 
 
In 2003, a controversial intellectual property dispute was initiated 
over images of the Bluenose, the iconic Nova Scotian tall ship etched 
on the Canadian dime. The Bluenose II Preservation Trust Society 
(“the Society”), a group tasked with maintaining a reproduction of 
the vessel, owned the copyright in the ship's architectural plans and 
began to assert monopoly rights over any use of the ship's image.22 
When a company manufacturing Bluenose souvenirs refused to pay a 
licensing fee, the Society sued for trademark and copyright 
infringement. Although the Society eventually dropped the lawsuit 
after the provincial government intervened, Teresa Scassa analyzed 
the validity of claims brought by the Society and found them to be 
“largely without merit,”23 while the copyright claim in particular 
verged on absurdity.24 Nonetheless, the Society had collected 
licensing fees from a range of local businesses for years prior to the 
lawsuit,25 illustrating the harmful and unjust effects of copyfraud. Far 
from being an isolated case, Scassa believes the overreaching 
behaviour of the Society is indicative of a larger trend: 
 
In the information age, and in an increasingly "branded" 
society, intellectual property has taken on a very 
significant commercial value. As a result, some entities 
                                                
20 Patry & Posner, supra note 16 at 1655-1656. 
21 Due to the costs of litigation and the power imbalance often present between 
owner and user groups, parties facing threats of legal action regularly choose the 
path of least resistance and simply accede to the frivolous claims. Judge Posner 
argues that the tendency of users to “underenforce their legitimate rights” is 
attributable to an “asymmetry of stakes” between owners and users of copyright. 
See Patry & Posner, supra note 16 at 1643, 1658. 
22 For an excellent account of the controversy, see Teresa Scassa, “Nickel and 
Dimed: The Dispute Over Intellectual Property Rights in the Bluenose II” (2004) 
22 Dalhousie LJ 293. 
23 Ibid at 319. 
24 Ibid (“[p]hotographs regularly incorporate objects and items that are built from 
two-dimensional design plans, as do sketches and paintings. If the Society's 
position were accepted, a photograph of children playing at a unique modular 
playground might infringe the copyright in the plans for the playground; a 
photograph of a person standing on someone's front lawn might infringe the 
copyright in the landscape design plans for that lawn. The possible examples are 
limitless” at 316). 
25 Ibid at 297. 
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may attempt to acquire intellectual property over things 
in which no such rights are likely to exist. It is a kind of 
intellectual property "gold rush" in which claims are 
staked over territory in the public domain. This approach 
poses a real threat to the public domain by effectively 
turning aspects of general culture into a private party's 
revenue stream. It also undermines the rights of those 
who cannot resist or respond to claims because of lack of 
resources. Instead they are forced to acknowledge the 
dominion of the other over the asserted intellectual 
property, regardless of whether the claims to intellectual 
property have merit.26 
 
Scassa's remarks highlight the significance of the disproportionate 
power dynamic existing between owner and user groups. The right to 
deal fairly in a work or reproduce material in the public domain is of 
little use to those unable to afford the legal fees necessary to defend 
those rights in a court of law. As over-claiming of copyright becomes 
increasingly systematic and lawsuits are instinctively threatened for 
every unauthorized use, regardless of its legality, the statutory limits 
and safety-valves of copyright will be rendered ineffectual, pre-
empted by a separate and distinct “law in action” law.27 
 
b) Contracts and TPMs: privately defined rights regimes 
 
The second category of overreach and abuse consists of protection 
measures that are substantively valid, but exist outside the 
boundaries of copyright law. Through a combination of contractual 
agreement and technological access and control measures, content 
holders are able to construct, almost entirely on their own terms, a 
comprehensive system of legally enforceable barriers governing the 
control of expressive works. In many instances, these privately 





                                                
26 Ibid at 299. 
27 See Erkstrand, supra note 11 (The term “law in action” law is originally 
attributed to Judge Richard Posner) at 566. 





Although the protection provided by copyright law is limited in 
nature, freedom of contract allows individuals to supersede those 
limits, amassing rights that would not otherwise be available under 
the Copyright Act.28 For example, if a consumer purchases a book 
from an online retailer, a contract may forbid any sale or transfer of 
the book to a third-party, effectively overriding the first sale doctrine. 
While two parties are fully within their rights to negotiate an 
agreement outside the purview of copyright law, this freedom 
becomes undermined in situations of unequal bargaining power, 
particularly when an individual is unaware of the true nature of the 
agreement or has little choice but to accept onerous contractual 
terms. 
 
These concerns have become especially pertinent in recent years due 
to the sudden proliferation of end user licensing agreements 
(EULAs), an umbrella term for clickwrap, browserwrap, shrinkwrap 
and other forms of contractual agreement characterized by a 
“common lack of negotiation, as the contract is dictated by the 
producer and acceptance is indicated by some act other than a written 
signature.”29 With a shrinkwrap agreement, for instance, the mere act 
of opening software packaging can produce a legally binding 
contract. Although details of the agreement were traditionally placed 
on the exterior of the box, the contractual terms are now usually 
found inside the box and acceptance is indicated by the purchaser's 
use of the product or failure to return the item within a certain length 
of time.30 In the context of clickwrap, the digital equivalent of 
shrinkwrap agreements, a user is typically required to scroll through 
an agreement and click a button indicating acceptance of the terms.31 
Such terms can be quite severe, touching upon a broad range of legal 
rights.32 The fact that individuals often have little or no knowledge 
                                                
28 See Jennifer Knight, “Copyright Misuse v. Freedom of Contract: And the 
Winner is...” (2005-2006) 73 Tenn L Rev 237 at 237. 
29 See Renée Zmurchyk, “Contractual Validity of End User Licence Agreements” 
(2006) 11 Appeal 55 at 55. 
30 Ibid at 58. 
31 Ibid at 56. 
32 Ibid (“[EULA] terms directly conflict with many legal rights including freedom 
of speech, product liability, privacy rights, security rights and intellectual property 
rights” at 60). 
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regarding the substance of these agreements is only further cause for 
concern.33 
 
Due in part to the recent trend of copyright owners licensing rather 
than selling digital content online, EULAs have fast become the 
norm in the content industry.34 They commonly include express 
prohibitions against reverse engineering, review or criticism (both of 
the product and the company), the disclosure of benchmark testing 
and the right to resell the product.35 They can even provide content 
holders with the right to unilaterally alter terms of the contract, 
regardless of whether the user is aware of the change.36 The potential 
consequences of this trend for copyright law are severe. According to 
Margaret Jane Radin, “the widespread regulation of intellectual 
property rights by contract threatens, in principle, to undermine the 
official regime of intellectual property.”37 As EULAs become more 
pervasive, “democratic debates about the fine details of intellectual 
property law will become irrelevant as more and more people are 
'contracted' out of the official regime,”38 effectively supplanting laws 
enacted by Parliament with a network of contractual obligations 
defined entirely by private entities. “Balanced copyright” (for lack of 




The current rate of technological advancement and the resulting 
proliferation of digital content, technological access and control 
                                                
33 See Lydia Pallas Loren, “Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: 
Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse” (2004) 30 Ohio 
NU L Rev 495 (highlighting the fact that few, if any, users actually read the terms 
of clickwrap agreements, Alchemy Mindworks presents users with the following 
contractual disclaimer: “a leather-winged demon of the night will tear itself, 
shrieking blood and fury, from the endless caverns of the nether world, hurl itself 
into the darkness with a thirst for blood on its slavering fangs and search the very 
threads of time for the throbbing of your heartbeat. Just thought you'd want to 
know that”) at 497. 
34 See Ian R Kerr, Alana Maurushat and Christian S Tacit, “Technical Protection 
Measures: Tilting at Copyright's Windmill” (2002-2003) 34 Ottawa L Rev 7 at 44-
45. 
35 See Loren, supra note 33 at 497. 
36 See Zmurchyk, supra note 29 at 61. 
37 Margaret Jane Radin, “Regime Change in Intellectual Property: Superseding the 
Law of the State with the "Law" of the Firm” (2003-2004) 1 UOLTJ 173 at 178. 
38 Ibid. 
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measures—along with the potential support of additional legal 
protections in the future—constitute perhaps the greatest challenge to 
copyright law in Canada. Technological protection measures 
(TPMs), sometimes referred to as “digital locks,” are mechanisms 
that protect access to, or control particular uses of, digital content. 
Common examples of TPMs include passwords and cryptography 
technologies.39 Similar to the flexibility provided by contract law, 
TPMs allow content holders to manoeuvre around the limits of 
copyright protection, placing virtual fences around content in the 
public domain and limiting functionality so as to prevent fair dealing 
in a work. While TPMs strengthen the hand of content holders, the 
protection they provide is nonetheless imperfect, as users of digital 
content are still free to remove digital locks if they possess the 
technical capabilities and know-how. This has led to a push from 
powerful private actors and certain governments on the international 
stage, primarily the United States,40 to place legal prohibitions on the 
circumvention of such technology. 
 
The United States already has an anti-circumvention regime in the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Although no such system exists in 
Canada, four attempts have been made to introduce legal protection 
for TPMs in the past seven years as part of a larger initiative for 
copyright reform. Bill C-60,41 C-6142 and C-3243 all died on the order 
paper, while Bill C-1144 is currently before Parliament. The issue of 
anti-circumvention laws has proved highly controversial, both in the 
United States and Canada. The primary concern of critics is the 
enormous discrepancy between the rights provided to owners under 
                                                
39 See Kerr, Maurushat and Tacit, supra note 34 at 13. 
40 In many cases, these forces are one and the same. According to Drahos and 
Braithwaite, the intellectual property agenda of the United States on the 
international stage is essentially driven by a small group of powerful corporations 
through ever expanding spheres of influence, a phenomenon they call “private 
networked governance.” See Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, “Hegemony 
Based on Knowledge: The Role of Intellectual Property” (2004) 21 Law In 
Context 204 at 206. 
41 Bill C-60, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 38th Parl, 2005 (first 
reading: 20 June 2005). 
42 Bill C-61, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2008 (first 
reading: 12 June 2008). 
43 Bill C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 3rd Sess, 40th Parl, 2010 (second 
reading: 5 November 2010). 
44 Bill C-11, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011 (second 
reading: 13 February 2012). 
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copyright law and the far more expansive rights available under anti-
circumvention regimes. Carys Craig identifies the crux of the matter: 
 
TPMs do not—and generally cannot—distinguish 
between lawful and unlawful uses and users. There is no 
necessary (and, typically, no practical) correlation 
between the limits imposed on would-be users by TPMs 
and the rights granted to copyright owners under the 
law.45 
 
Because rights under anti-circumvention regimes are defined by a 
technological system, not by the nature of the content protected by 
that system, nearly anything can be subject to legal protection, no 
matter how foreign to copyright law. For this reason, anti-
circumvention laws have been referred to as “paracopyright,”46 an 
entirely new system of rights that extends far beyond copyright law, 
subject to none of its statutory limits or safety-valves. Digital locks 
do not differentiate between works in the public domain and works 
subject to copyright, nor do they recognize dealings with works that 
are fair or even forms of expression ineligible for copyright 
protection. In almost every instance, the same legal rights and 
remedies are applied with equal force.47 
 
c) Providing copyright with room to breathe 
 
According to Carys Craig, exceptions such as fair dealing provide 
the necessary “breathing space” for a properly functioning copyright 
system.48 However, as copyfraud, contracts and technological 
protection measures are employed with greater frequency to restrict 
these safety valves and amass rights not available under the 
Copyright Act, the balance inherent in copyright, as well as the 
relevancy of the entire copyright regime, is effectively being choked 
                                                
45 Carys Craig, “Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and Anti-
Circumvention” in Michael Geist, ed, From “Radical Extremism” to “Balanced 
Copyright” (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 177 at 192. 
46 See Dan L Burk, “Anti-circumvention Misuse” 50 UCLA L Rev 1095 at 1109. 
47 Bill C-32 did contain specific exceptions to circumvention liability, but they are 
narrowly defined and of little practical value to the average copyright user. This 
criticism applies equally to the American DMCA system. See Craig, supra note 45 
at 194. 
48 Ibid at 177. 
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out of existence. If this outcome is to be avoided (or at least 
forestalled), an effective deterrent to overreach and abuse is urgently 
needed. One potential answer is the American doctrine of copyright 
misuse. Although certainly no panacea, the defence has been 
successfully raised by copyright users in the United States in the 
context of abusive contracts, often in relation to software licensing 
agreements, making it well-adapted to the challenges of an 
increasingly digital and technologically dependant world. As a 
judicial doctrine based in equity, it also has the flexibility to expand 
into novel areas, preventing other problematic behaviour such as 
copyfraud. It may even be capable of addressing concerns relating to 
TPMs and anti-circumvention laws, possibly through the 
development of a separate but related doctrine of anti-circumvention 
misuse. 
 
Part II: Copyright Misuse in the United States 
 
a) From patents to copyrights 
 
Copyright misuse is a defence in American common law to copyright 
infringement. Based upon the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands,” 
the principle behind copyright misuse states that a copyright owner 
should be barred from enforcing their monopoly rights in an 
expressive work if they are found to have “misused” their statutory 
grant of rights. Two approaches to characterizing misuse have 
emerged: 1) an “anti-trust approach,” which limits misuse to 
behaviour that is anti-competitive in nature, and 2) a “public policy 
approach,” which applies more broadly to activity perceived as 
contrary to the underlying public policy of copyright.49 
 
Copyright misuse originally grew out of the older, more firmly 
entrenched doctrine of patent misuse. In Motion Picture Patents v. 
Universal Film Manufacturing. Co.,50 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
against the validity of a licensing agreement for the use of a patented 
movie projector which required that the licensee also purchase 
unpatented film to be used with the equipment. “It is an attempt, 
without statutory warrant, to continue the patent monopoly in this 
                                                
49 See Brett Frischmann and Dan Moylan, “Evolving Common Law Doctrine of 
Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software” (2000) 15 
Berk Tech LJ 865 at 867. 
50 243 US 502, 37 S Ct 416 (1917). 
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particular character of the film after it has expired,” stated the court, 
and “to enforce it would be to create a monopoly in the manufacture 
and use of moving picture films, wholly outside of the patent...”51 
Motion Picture Patents effectively laid the groundwork for future 
interventions by the court on the grounds of equity when an 
intellectual property owner transgressed the bounds of their limited 
monopoly rights. It was not until the landmark Supreme Court case 
of Morton Salt v. Suppiger,52 however, that the defence of patent 
misuse became fully entrenched in U.S. common law, opening the 
door for the future growth of an equivalent doctrine of misuse for 
copyright. 
 
Like many cases in the misuse jurisprudence, the behaviour by the 
plaintiff in Morton Salt v. Suppiger raised competition concerns. 
Suppiger, the manufacturer of a patented salt-depositing machine, 
licensed his product on the condition that the licensee only purchase 
his unpatented salt tablets for use with the device. When Morton 
began to manufacture and sell a similar salt-depositing machine, 
Suppiger brought an action for infringement. Upholding the decision 
of the trial judge, the Court rejected his claim, ruling that the use of a 
patent to control the market of a non-patented product constituted 
patent misuse. The grant of a limited-term patent monopoly was a 
“special privilege,” reasoned the court, provided by the state for the 
purpose of advancing specific public policy goals, namely the 
promotion of “the Progress of Science and useful Arts” set out in the 
U.S. Constitution.53 Suppiger's attempt to claim rights above and 
beyond his grant was contrary to such goals and therefore a violation 
of that privilege. Although issues of competition were at the heart of 
the public policy concerns in Morton, the court made clear that its 
ruling was based purely in equity, not anti-trust law, declining to 
engage traditional anti-trust analysis under the Clayton Act.54 
 
In making their decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged in dicta 
the existence of a related doctrine of copyright misuse. The Court 
cited two cases, Edward Thompson Co. v. Am. Law Book Co.55 and 
                                                
51 Ibid at 518. 
52 314 US 488, 62 S Ct 402 (1942) [Morton]. 
53 Ibid at 492. 
54Ibid at 494. 
55 122 F 922 (2d Cir 1903). 
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Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co.,56 “for the application 
of the like doctrine in the case of copyright.”57 Given that the 
copyright misuse cases referred to by the court were similarly 
decided on the basis of equity, not anti-trust law, commentators have 
cited this fact as justification for developing a broad approach to 
copyright misuse unrestricted by anti-trust analysis.58 However, due 
to the passage of legislation, patent misuse now closely resembles an 
anti-trust-based defence59 and the correct approach to copyright 
misuse remains in question. 
 
b) Lasercomb v. Reynolds: copyright misuse is born 
 
The doctrine of copyright misuse laid mostly dormant until 
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,60 the first case to fully develop 
and uphold the defence in a federal court of appeals.61 Lasercomb 
America, a manufacturer of steel rule dies used to cut and score 
cardboard, developed software called Interact to guide the process. 
This software was licensed to other cardboard manufacturing 
companies, including Lasercomb's competitor Holiday Steel, under 
strict terms of non-competition. Job Reynolds, a computer 
programmer for Holiday Steel, circumvented the software's 
protective measures and produced unauthorized copies of the 
program under the direction of the company's president Larry 
Holliday. Holiday Steel then began selling its own software, which 
was almost an exact copy of Interact. Lasercomb sued Holiday Steel, 
naming Holliday and Reynolds as co-defendants. The District Court 
granted an injunction against Holliday and awarded Lasercomb 
damages on the basis of copyright infringement, breach of contract 
and fraud. 
 
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Holliday and Reynolds raised the 
defence of copyright misuse, attacking the software licensing 
agreement between the two companies as unduly restrictive. The 
licence sold by Lasercomb precluded Holliday from developing rival 
software in any manner for a period of 99 years. After affirming the 
                                                
56 220 F 837 (5th Cir 1915). 
57 Morton, supra note 52 at 494. 
58 See Frischmann and Moylan, supra note 49 at 883. 
59 See 35 USC § 271(d) (1994). 
60 911 F2d 970 (4th Cir 1990) [Lasercomb]. 
61 See Frischmann and Moylan, supra note 49 at 888. 
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availability of copyright misuse as a defence, the court agreed that 
the licensing agreement was problematic. The non-compete language 
suppressed “any attempt by the licensee to independently implement 
the idea which Interact expresses,”62 effectively undermining the 
idea/expression dichotomy. In addition, the company was required to 
“forego utilization of the creative abilities of all its officers, directors 
and employees in the area of CAD/CAM die-making software,”63 
with the consequence that society as a whole, not just the company, 
would be deprived of their creative output. Finally, the duration of 
the agreement “could be longer than the copyright itself.”64 By 
reaching beyond the scope of the statutory grant, Lasercomb was 
“attempting to use its copyright in a manner adverse to the public 
policy embodied in copyright law.”65 The Court therefore concluded 
that the licence constituted a misuse of copyright and set aside the 
damages for copyright infringement. 
 
Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the relatively scant 
precedent supporting the defence, the Court reasoned that copyright 
misuse was a logical extension of patent misuse given the shared 
public policies underlying the two forms of intellectual property. 
Tracing the historical origins of patent and copyright law in England, 
as well as their entrenchment in the U.S. Constitution and subsequent 
statutory and judicial developments, the Court observed: 
 
Both patent law and copyright law seek to increase the 
store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding 
inventors and authors with the exclusive rights to their 
works for a limited time. At the same time, the granted 
monopoly power does not extend to property not 
covered by the patent or copyright.66 
 
Given the existence of these common ends, the court found ample 
justification “for the application of the misuse defense to copyright 
as well as patent law.”67 
 
                                                




66 Ibid at 976. 
67 Ibid at 974. 
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In upholding the defence, the court was careful to clearly separate the 
misuse analysis from anti-trust law. Referring to the Supreme Court 
decision in Morton Salt as an authority, “the question is not whether 
the copyright is being used in a manner violative [sic] of antitrust law 
(such as whether the licensing agreement is ‘reasonable’), but 
whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative [sic] of the 
public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.”68 
 
c) Copyright misuse jurisprudence post-Lasercomb 
 
Following the germinal decision in Lasercomb, courts have been 
unable to agree upon a single, coherent doctrinal approach to 
copyright misuse. Although a number of relatively minor issues 
persist, the most fundamental area of disagreement concerns the role 
played by anti-trust law in the analysis. At one end of the spectrum 
are cases that reject the public policy approach adopted in Lasercomb 
outright, instead employing a two-step “rule of reason” test modelled 
on anti-trust law, which requires a defendant to show actual anti-
competitive effects.69 Guided by Judge Posner's reasoning in 
Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc.,70 sceptics of 
the public policy approach argue that anti-trust law offers more 
certain principles to ground a misuse analysis. It should be noted, 
however, that Judge Posner seems to have reversed his previous 
position in light of the growing trend of abusive behaviour among 
copyright owners,71 while other commentators have criticized the 
                                                
68 Ibid at 978. 
69 See Frischmann and Moylan, supra note 49 at 898. 
70 816 F2d 1191 at 1200 (7th Circ 1987) (“'[i]f misuse claims are not tested by 
conventional antitrust principles, by what principles shall they be tested? Our law 
is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the 
date to try to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent 
holders to debilitating uncertainty.' This point applies with even greater force to 
copyright misuse, where the danger of monopoly is less”). 
71 More than simply a reversal of his former position, Posner now suggests that 
procedural issues may lead to a finding of copyright misuse. Patry & Posner, supra 
note 16 (“[t]he doctrine of copyright misuse is thus applicable where litigation is 
threatened in an effort to extract a licensing fee or other profit when there is no 
reasonable basis for supposing that the threatener's copyright has been infringed. 
The intent and effect of such behavior are to give the copyright owner more legal 
protection than copyright law is designed to do - which is a serviceable definition 
of copyright misuse” at 1658); Assessment Techs of Wis, LLC, v. WIREdata, Inc, 
350 F3D 640 at 647 (7th Cir 2003) [WIREdata] (“[t]he argument for applying 
copyright misuse beyond the bounds of anti-trust ... is that for a copyright owner to 
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anti-trust approach as confusing the purposes of copyright and anti-
trust law.72 
 
At the other end of the spectrum are cases fully removed from the 
anti-competition context, potentially extending the misuse doctrine to 
cover restrictions preventing the dissemination of critical language 
and information,73 as well as procedural abuses, such as making 
hollow threats of litigation in order to bully parties into settlement.74 
There is a certain degree of overlap between nearly all approaches, 
however, with many applications of the doctrine sharing common 
analytical elements (asking, for instance, whether a restraint falls 
within the scope of the grant). An exploration of the merits of the 
two contrasting approaches is beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
topic has been dealt with at length elsewhere.75 
 
One area in which copyright misuse is yet to be recognized is in the 
context of anti-circumvention technology.76 Due to this limit on the 
doctrine's scope, fears have been raised that copyright owners are 
now incentivized to actively misuse paracopyright in a manner 
contrary to the public interest.77 Such concerns seem to be well-
placed. In the relatively short time since the DMCA was passed in 
the United States, anti-circumvention rights have already been 
applied in a manner that largely mirrors the abuses of copyright 
owners in copyright misuse cases.78 Commentators such as Dan Burk 
have responded by stressing the need to develop a separate but 
related doctrine of anti-circumvention misuse, noting that much of 
                                                
use an infringement suit to obtain property protection, here in data, that copyright 
law clearly does not confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an 
outright victory over an opponent that may lack the resources or the legal 
sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of process.”) 
72 See Neal Hartzog, “Gaining Momentum” (2004) 10 Mich Telecomm Tech L 
Rev 373 at 400. 
73 See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc v Random House, Inc, 366 F2d 303 at 205-206 
(2nd Cir 1966). For commentary, see  Hartzog, supra note 72 at 391. 
74See Wiredata, supra note 70 at 647 (7th Cir 2003) (See note 71 above for Judge 
Posner's commentary in the case.) 
75 See Frischmann and Moylan, supra note 49 at 897-900. 
76 See Lexmark International, Inc v Static Control Components, Inc 253 F Supp 2D 
943 at 966 (2003). 
77 See Jason Sheets, “Copyright Misuse: The Impact of the DMCA Anti-
circumvention Measures on Fair & Innovative Markets” (2000-2001) Hastings 
Comm Ent LJ 1 at 21-22. 
78 See Burk, supra note 46 at 1136. 
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the groundwork has already been laid: “the precedent for elaborating 
such an anti-circumvention misuse claim lies in the recent 
development of copyright misuse imported from the patent context. 
Misuse may again be transplanted out of its previous milieu and into 
the realm of anti-circumvention.”79 Others have suggested that the 
existing doctrine of copyright misuse is adequately flexible to 
address certain anti-circumvention misuses.80 However, American 
courts have yet to move in either direction. 
 
Despite the fact that copyright misuse remains doctrinally uncertain 
and has yet to be expressly adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court, scholars generally agree that the doctrine's acceptance is 
growing.81 Similar observations have been made by other courts 
encountering the defence.82 This can partly be attributed to the 
increasing ubiquity of technology in society and a resulting reliance 
on licensing agreements to govern rights to copyrighted works in the 
digital environment, an area in which copyright misuse is particularly 
well-suited and most frequently raised.83 Regardless of the doctrine's 
ultimate destination in American jurisprudence, however, its judicial 
origins and underlying basis in equity render it sufficiently adaptable 
to a host of new legal challenges.84 As a result, any attempt to import 
copyright misuse into Canada should not fixate unduly on the 
specific applications of the doctrine in the American context; the 
primary issue for consideration is whether copyright misuse, 






                                                
79 Ibid at 1137. 
80 See Sheets, supra note 77 at 22-25. 
81 See Cross and Yu, supra note 3 at 458; Hartzog, supra note 72 at 405. 
82 See re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F Supp 1087 at 1103 (ND Cal 
2002) (in one of the most detailed overviews of copyright misuse since Lasercomb 
more than a decade prior, the court observed that the law of copyright misuse was 
still in an undeveloped state, but courts had nonetheless shown an increasing 
willingness to apply the doctrine). 
83 See Hartzog, supra note 72 at 387. 
84 Ibid (“[b]ecause the misuse doctrine is one of judicial creation, it is easily 
adapted to resolve novel conflicts that will appear with increasing regularity due to 
the rapid advance in technological innovation”). 
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Part III: Copyright Misuse in Canada 
 
a) An unaddressed issue 
 
In comparison to the United States, Canadian jurisprudence and 
academic literature on the subject of copyright misuse is scant and 
underdeveloped. While some scholars have noted in brief the need to 
import such a doctrine into Canadian law, none have seriously 
attempted to do so. Sunny Handa is possibly the first academic to 
raise the idea, proposing copyright misuse as a means of protecting 
the ability of users to engage in reverse engineering of computer 
software.85 Noting that the doctrine's basis in equity makes the 
defence potentially available to Canadian litigants, Handa further 
suggests that the existence of copyright misuse has already been 
implicitly acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada in Massie 
& Renwick Ltd. v. Underwriters' Survey Bureau Ltd.86 In contrast, 
Handa also notes that the Federal Court of Appeal has expressed 
doubts that anti-competitive behaviour can provide a defence against 
copyright infringement.87 However, both cases are quite old, 
approximately 70 and 30 years respectively, so they seem hardly 
applicable in the modern technological era, particularly given the 
context of software licensing agreements in which copyright misuse 
first arose. 
 
More recently, Canadian academics have turned their attention to 
copyright misuse in response to controversy surrounding TPMs and 
various attempts to amend the Copyright Act to provide legal 
protection against the circumvention of such measures. Concerned 
about the potential chilling effect paracopyright might have on 
competition, creativity and the dissemination of knowledge and 
information, Alex Cameron and Robert Tomkowicz propose either 
incorporating copyright misuse into Canadian law or amending the 
Copyright Act to incorporate the doctrine's principles, arguing that 
such a move “could help further both copyright and competition 
policy goals.”88 Sharing many of the same concerns, Michael Geist 
                                                
85 Sunny Handa, “Reverse Engineering Computer Programs Under Canadian 
Copyright Law” (1995) 40 McGill L J 650 at 650-652. 
86 [1940] SCR 218, [1940] 1 DLR 625. 
87 Bell Canada v Intra Canada Telecommunications (1982), 70 CPR (2d) 252. 
88 Alex Cameron and Robert Tomkowicz, “Competition Policy and Canada's New 
Breed of 'Copyright' Law” (2007) 52 McGill LJ 291 at 328-329. 
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also offers copyright misuse as a possible counterweight to anti-
circumvention measures, warning that “without a legal principle to 
mitigate against abuse, Canada would be open to the prospect for 
even greater abuse of anti-circumvention provisions than that found 
in the United States.”89 Finally, Michal Shur-Ofry explores copyright 
misuse, or a slightly altered form of the doctrine, as a means of 
furthering his somewhat radical proposal to limit the scope of 
copyright protection based on the popularity of a work.90 However, 
like most scholars touching on the subject, Shur-Ofry mentions the 
doctrine in brief and makes no attempt to justify the defence in the 
Canadian context. 
 
While few scholars have attempted to provide a sound basis for 
recognizing copyright misuse in Canada, fewer still have advanced 
arguments against its viability. Among those who have, two issues 
have been raised. First, it has been argued that the Canadian 
Copyright Act lacks a clear and explicit statement of purpose. 
Without a statutory or constitutional provision similar to that of the 
U.S. Progress Clause, Canada does not have a firmly articulated 
policy basis in which to employ the copyright misuse defence.91 
Second, doubts have been raised following the recent decision of 
Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Can. Inc.,92 the first Supreme Court of 
Canada case to expressly mention the term “copyright misuse.” 
Although the doctrine was only referenced in dicta and had no 
bearing on the outcome of the dispute, the Court's reception to the 
idea has nonetheless been viewed as unfavourable.93 However, 
neither of these concerns provides a sufficient basis to discount a 





                                                
89 Michael Geist, “Anti-circumvention Legislation and Competition Policy: 
Defining a Canadian Way?” in Michael Geist, ed, In the Public Interest (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2005) 211 at 248. 
90 Michal Shur-Ofry, “Popularity as a Factor in Copyright Law” (2009) 59 U 
Toronto LJ 528 at 574-577. 
91 See Lisa Anne Katz Jones, “Is Viewing a Web Page Copyright Infringement?” 
(1998) 4 Appeal 60 n 38. 
92 2007 SCC 37 [Euro-Excellence]. 
93 See Cross and Yu, supra note 3 at 458-459. 
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b) Importing the doctrine into Canadian law 
 
As we have seen, certain U.S. courts have consistently stressed the 
public policy behind copyright—a limited grant of monopoly rights 
aimed at spurring the creation and dissemination of knowledge and 
information—as justification for the misuse defence. From this 
perspective, overprotection is just as dangerous as underprotection, 
and courts therefore have a duty to intervene when owners of 
intellectual property attempt to claim rights beyond the scope of their 
grant. So fundamental is this understanding of copyright in the 
American context that it is expressly entrenched in article 1, section 
8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution, a provision commonly 
referred to as the “Progress Clause”: 
 
[The Congress shall have power] To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writing and Discoveries.94 
 
The Canadian Copyright Act contains no explicit statement of 
purpose comparable to that of the Progress Clause and Canadian 
constitutional documents are equally silent on the matter. However, a 
clear public policy underlying copyright in Canada does nonetheless 
exist. It is derived from two sources: first, an inherited British system 
of copyright law, including a history and tradition that similarly 
shaped developments in the American context; and second, a recent 
trilogy of cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, which 
articulated for the first time a distinctly Canadian understanding of 
copyright law and its purpose in society. Taken together, these 
sources provide a strong justification for the application of copyright 
misuse in Canada. 
 
i) The British tradition 
 
When looking to evidence of copyright's purpose in the United 
States, a common starting point is the Progress Clause in the United 
States Constitution, with further discussion usually then leading to 
the recognition of the influence played by early British developments 
in the area of copyright law. In Lasercomb, the foundational case for 
                                                
94 US Const art I, § 8, cl 8. 
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copyright misuse in the United States, the court took the reverse 
approach, beginning with the emergence of “letters” patent in 
sixteenth century England and the subsequent adoption in 1710 of 
the Statute of Anne.95 Commonly acknowledged as the world's first 
modern copyright legislation, the Statute of Anne contained an overt 
statement of purpose within its formal title: An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books 
in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times 
therein mentioned.96 
 
The statute stood as a utilitarian bargain.97 Authors were offered a 
limited-term monopoly in the reproduction of their published works 
as an incentive to create, fostering greater innovation and creativity 
in society. After the term expired, works would enter into the public 
domain and others would be free to copy and build upon the concepts 
and expressions contained within. In this regard, the rights granted 
under the statute were clearly instrumentalist in nature, aimed at 
promoting the public interest in the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge. This understanding of copyright has had a lasting effect 
not only in Britain, but also in the United States and Canada. 
 
As the court in Lasercomb observed, the framers of the United States 
Constitution continued the British tradition with the enactment of the 
Progress Clause, a statement of copyright's purpose closely aligned 
with the Statute of Anne.98 The first Act governing copyright in the 
United States, entitled An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by 
securing the copies of Maps, Charts and Books to the authors and 
proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned,99 
reflects the same British influence,100 as did early copyright 
                                                
95 Supra note 60 at 974. 
96 1709 (UK), 8 Anne, c 19. 
97 See Paula Samuelson, “Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical 
Perspective” (2003) 10 J Intell Prop L 319 at 324. 
98 Supra note 60 at 975. 
99 1 Statutes at Large 124 (1790). 
100 See P Goldstein, Copyright's Highway (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995) (the 
legislation was “modeled after the Statute of Anne” and is illustrative of how, in 
the early years at least, “copyright in the United States paralleled the development 
of copyright in England” at 51); See also Myra Tawfik, “History in the Balance: 
Copyright and Access to Knowledge” in Michael Geist, ed, From Radical 
Extremism to Balanced Copyright (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 69 at 78. 
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legislation adopted at the state level.101 Although the United States 
now represents the world's most prominent voice regarding issues of 
intellectual property, pushing its own distinct brand of copyright law 
and theory, its British roots remain without question.102 
 
Compared to the United States, Canada is even more beholden to the 
British system of copyright law.103 In fact, it was not until the passage 
of the 1911 Copyright Act104 in Britain that Canada and other British 
Dominions were granted the authority to repeal all existing Imperial 
copyright laws currently in force at the time.105 When Canada finally 
enacted its first modern copyright statute a decade later in 1921,106 it 
was essentially a copy of Britain's 1911 Act and many elements of 
the British-influenced legislation remain in place today.107 Given that 
Canada and the United States share the same legislative and judicial 
heritage in the area of copyright, and the influence of early English 
developments in intellectual property law has been cited as 
justification for copyright misuse in the United States, it logically 
follows that the misuse doctrine cannot be wholly alien to the 
Canadian understanding of copyright. At the very least, solid ground 
exists for further exploration of the doctrine's legitimacy in Canada. 
 
ii) The copyright “trilogy” 
 
Despite the strong historical connection to the British tradition of 
copyright law in Canada, or perhaps even because of it, a clear 
articulation of a distinctly Canadian understanding of copyright law 
                                                
101 Goldstein, supra note 99 (in 1783, Connecticut enacted the first state copyright 
legislation entitled an act “for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius” at 51). 
102 See Samuelson, supra note 97 (“[u]ntil very recently, U.S. copyright law has 
been true to the basic principles of the Statute of Anne” at 326); Craig W Dallon, 
“The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring 
the Public Interest” (2004) 44 Santa Clara L Rev 365 (calling the Statute of Anne 
“the direct progenitor of American copyright law”); Sunny Handa, Copyright Law 
in Canada, (Markham, ON: Butterworths, 2002) at 44. 
103 See Handa, supra note 102 (“[i]n contrast to the U.S., which charted its own 
course after gaining independence, the Canadian history of copyright has largely 
remained in step with that of Britain” at 53). 
104 An Act to amend and consolidate the Law relating to Copyright (UK), 1 & 2 
Geo 5, c 46. 
105 See Handa, supra note 102 at 54. 
106 Statutes of Canada, 11-12 Geo V 1921, c 24. 
107 See Gervais, supra note 6 at 326. 
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failed to emerge until only recently.108 According to Daniel Gervais, 
it was not until the copyright “trilogy”—three landmark cases 
beginning with Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain109 in 
2002 and later followed by CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of 
Upper Canada110 and SOCAIN v. CAIP111 two years after—that the 
Supreme Court of Canada stepped in to fill the purposive vacuum. 
The principles laid down in these three cases provide a clear 
justificatory basis for copyright misuse in Canada. 
 
In Théberge, the first case in the trilogy, the Court had to determine 
whether a process of transferring ink from a poster onto a canvas 
backing constituted “reproduction” as understood under the 
Copyright Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Binnie took the 
opportunity to fully articulate for the first time the purpose of 
copyright law in Canada, defining it as: “a balance between 
promoting the public interest in the encouragement and 
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just 
reward for the creator...”112 A number of important principles have 
emerged from this seemingly simple statement of purpose, several of 
which are particularly relevant in the context of copyright misuse. 
 
First, the concept of “balance” between dual objectives, one of which 
is the public interest, indicates that copyright law in Canada cannot 
be viewed entirely through the eyes of the rights-holder; there are 
other legitimate interests at stake. Second, it logically follows from 
this concept of balance that the rights of owners must necessarily be 
limited in nature. If at any time these limits are surpassed, the proper 
balance will be undermined and the public interest threatened. The 
Court cautioned against “excessive control by holders of copyrights” 
for this reason, warning that it may “unduly limit the ability of the 
public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in 
the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical 
obstacles to proper utilization.”113 Third, the Court spoke of copyright 
in decidedly economic terms. Employing the rationale of incentives, 
they reasoned that it would be “as inefficient to overcompensate 
                                                
108 Ibid at 317. 
109 Théberge, supra note 6. 
110 CCH, supra note 6. 
111 SOCAN, supra note 6. 
112 Supra note 6 at para 30. 
113 Ibid at para 32. 
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artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self-
defeating to undercompensate them.”114 It would appear that, from an 
economic perspective, the rights and rewards of copyright owners are 
not an end in themselves. Commentators have interpreted such 
statements as constituting a marked shift to a more instrumentalist 
view of copyright, one focused on ensuring “the orderly production 
and distribution of, and access to, works of art and intellect.”115 
 
Théberge was decided by a narrow 4-3 majority, with two justices 
absent from the decision. If there were any lingering doubts 
regarding the precedential authority of the case, however, they were 
thoroughly put to rest two years later in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law 
Society of Upper Canada. At issue was whether the Law Society's 
Great Library was liable for copyright infringement for photocopying 
and distributing legal materials published by CCH Canadian. Writing 
for a unanimous Supreme Court, Chief Justice McLachlin affirmed 
the dual objectives articulated by Justice Binnie in Théberge, 
adopting the concept of “balance” as a guide for establishing a 
definition of originality under the Act: 
 
When courts adopt a standard of originality requiring 
only that something be more than a mere copy or that 
someone simply show industriousness to ground 
copyright in a work, they tip the scale in favour of the 
author's or creator's rights, at the loss of society's interest 
in maintaining a robust public domain that could help 
foster future creative innovation.116 
 
Echoing the language employed in Théberge, McLachlin C.J. 
stressed the dangers of overprotection, warning against the 
impoverishment of the public domain and the likely consequences of 
intellectual and creative stagnation. In the interest of society and 
follow-on creators, she underscored the need to “safeguard against 
the author being overcompensated for his or her work.”117 
 
The Court in CCH also took the significant step of granting further 
weight and legitimacy to the interests of users of copyrighted works. 
                                                
114 Ibid at para. 31. 
115 Gervais, supra note 6 at 317. 
116 CCH, supra note 6 at para 23. 
117 Ibid at para 23. 
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In the process of defining the scope of fair dealing, the Court 
characterized the statutory exception to copyright infringement as a 
positive right, not simply a defence, held by copyright users: “The 
fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a 
user's right. In order to maintain the proper balance between the 
rights of a copyright owner and users' interests, it must not be 
interpreted restrictively.”118 The concept of users' rights extends 
beyond fair dealing to include all exceptions under the Copyright 
Act. This means that the interests of copyright-holders must not only 
be balanced against the public interest generally, but also against the 
individual rights of each copyright user. 
 
In the last case of the trilogy, SOCAN, the Court was tasked with 
determining the potential liability of Internet service providers (ISPs) 
for the transmission of copyright protected content across their 
networks. Although the decision primarily turned on matters of 
statutory interpretation, the Court nonetheless began their analysis by 
acknowledging the principle of balance established in Théberge, as 
well as the unique interests engaged by the technology-specific 
context of the appeal, noting: 
 
The capacity of the Internet to disseminate “works of the 
arts and intellect” is one of the great innovations of the 
information age. Its use should be facilitated rather than 
discouraged, but this should not be done unfairly at the 
expense of those who created the works of arts and 
intellect in the first place.119 
 
The Court ultimately found that ISPs, acting as mere conduits of 
information, have not “authorized” or “communicated” content as 
defined under the Act and should therefore be exempt from liability. 
In the view of Daniel Gervais, the decision in SOCAN shows clear 
evidence of economic and instrumentalist reasoning. Given that the 
Internet is a public good and ISPs are its guardian, “it would be 
economically inefficient to impose a liability on them to merely 
transmit content they do not control,” writes Gervais. “[I]f liability 
exists for content being transmitted on the Internet, ISPs are not a 
                                                
118 Ibid at para 48. 
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proper target for rightsholders.”120 If economic considerations are 
becoming increasingly central to the Court’s interpretation of 
copyright, then the inefficiencies of overcompensating creators 
warned of in Théberge should hold further weight, underscoring the 
need to prevent copyright owners from extending their control of 
expressive works beyond the scope of their statutory grant of rights.    
 
Together, the trilogy of cases stands for the proposition that 
copyright protection should be limited in nature. Rather than being 
an end unto itself, copyright serves a clear purpose, one that can be 
undermined by too much protection. This understanding goes to the 
core of copyright misuse and is roughly analogous to the reasoning 
employed by U.S. courts enforcing the doctrine. In fact, some aspects 
of the Canadian context arguably provide greater support for the 
misuse defence than in the United States. Not only has the Supreme 
Court of Canada stressed the limited nature of copyright through the 
concept of balance, warning against the negative repercussions of 
excessive protection, but the language of “user's rights” goes beyond 
that of American copyright jurisprudence. Not only is the public 
interest threatened when copyright owners claim rights outside the 
scope of the grant, but the rights of users, which must not be 
subjugated to the rights of copyright owners, are also trampled as a 
result. Add in the economic and utilitarian calculations that 
increasingly drive judicial decision-making on matters of copyright 
and it becomes difficult to understand how instances of overreach 
and abuse can be allowed to continue unchecked. If a sufficient 
justificatory basis for copyright misuse in Canada did not exist prior 
to 2002, then it must surely exist now. 
 
iii) “Best left for another day” 
 
Soon after the copyright trilogy was decided, Euro-Excellence Inc. v. 
Kraft Can. Inc. arrived on the Supreme Court docket. As the first 
case to expressly mention the doctrine of copyright misuse, albeit 
only in passing, some commentators have argued that Euro-
Excellence potentially stands as a complete rejection of the defence 
in Canada.121 However, such a conclusion represents a misreading of 
the decision and is unwarranted on a number of grounds. 
                                                
120 Supra note 6 at 324. 
121 See Cross and Yu, supra note 3 at 458. 




The dispute in Euro-Excellence concerned the parallel importation of 
goods. Kraft, the owner of Côte d'Or and Toblerone chocolate bars, 
attempted to stop Euro-Excellence from purchasing the chocolate 
bars in Europe and importing them into Canada by alleging 
secondary infringement of the copyrighted logos on the packaging. 
The Court rejected the claim, ruling that Euro-Excellence could not 
be held secondarily liable because no primary infringement had 
occurred. In the course of the proceedings, Euro-Excellence asserted 
a defence of copyright misuse. 
 
The only opinion to expressly acknowledge the attempted defence, 
written by Justice Bastarache and supported by Justices LeBel and 
Charron, declined to rule on the doctrine's validity given the 
plaintiff's failure to make out their case. The Court's finding that no 
infringement of Kraft's copyright actually occurred rendered “an 
appeal to this developing doctrine unnecessary” and, as result, the 
possible application of copyright misuse in Canada was “best left for 
another day.”122 
 
Although Bastarache J. deferred the question of copyright misuse, 
his opinion nonetheless turned on logic surprisingly similar to that of 
the misuse doctrine. He argued that copyright owners should not be 
able to assert copyright protection in a work in the context of 
secondary infringement when the copyright is being used in a 
manner “incidental” to a product being sold.123 As a result, Kraft 
cannot use the copyrighted logo appearing on their packaging as a 
means of protecting market share or goodwill in consumer goods, a 
domain traditionally reserved for trademark law. In support of this 
principle, Bastarache J. cited the case of Kirkbi v. Ritvik Holdings,124 
which held that trademarks cannot be leveraged to protect subject 
matter that normally falls within the domain of patent: 
 
Trade-mark law protects market share in commercial 
goods; copyright protects the economic gains resulting 
from an exercise of skill and judgment. If trade-mark law 
does not protect market share in a particular situation, 
                                                
122 Euro-Excellence, supra note 92 at para 98. 
123 Ibid at para 95. 
124 Kirkbi AG v Ritvik Holdings Inc, 2005 SCC 65. 
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the law of copyright should not be used to provide that 
protection, if that requires contorting copyright outside 
its normal sphere of operation. The protection offered by 
copyright cannot be leveraged to include protection of 
economic interests that are only tangentially related to 
the copyrighted work [emphasis added].125 
 
Despite Bastarache J.'s stated intent not to answer the copyright 
misuse question, this passage seems strangely reminiscent of the 
misuse defence. Justice Bastarache even grounded his reasoning in 
the purpose of the Copyright Act, the principles of which he derived 
from the copyright trilogy mentioned earlier, and the concept of 
“balance” in copyright.126 
 
The opinion of Justice Rothstein, supported by Justices Binnie, 
Deschamps and the concurring opinion of Justice Fish, strongly 
disagreed with the parallel drawn between the Kirkbi decision and 
the case before them: 
 
The difficulty in attempting to analogize this case and 
Kirkbi is that the Court in Kirkbi relied on a provision of 
the Trade-marks Act in order to find that there could be 
no overlap between trade-mark and patent. In contrast, s. 
64(3)(b) of the Copyright Act permits a single work to be 
the subject of both copyright and trade-mark protection. 
In other words, Parliament has authorized an overlap 
between copyright and trade-mark.127 
 
Although commentators have suggested otherwise,128 this reasoning 
does not conflict with the logic underlying copyright misuse. In most 
instances, the defence only applies when a copyright holder has 
attempted to extend their copyright beyond the scope of the grant. 
However, in the case of Euro-Excellence, Justice Rothstein found 
that Parliament clearly intended to authorize concurrent copyright 
and trade-mark protection, meaning that the use in question fell well 
within the legitimate scope of the grant. It is impossible to “misuse” 
                                                
125 Euro-Excellence, supra note 92 at para 83. 
126 Ibid at para 84. 
127 Ibid at para 13. 
128 See Cross and Yu, supra note 3 (arguing that Justice Rothstein's opinion 
explicitly rejects the possibility of copyright misuse in Canada at 459). 
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a copyright for a purpose that, according to Justice Rothstein, is 
endorsed by Parliament. Given that copyright misuse has no 
theoretical application in such instances, the Court had no justifiable 
reason to expound upon the potential application of a novel judicial 
doctrine. Thus, not only was Euro-Excellence not liable for 
secondary infringement, making the consideration of valid defences 
unnecessary, but Rothstein's interpretation of the Copyright Act 
rendered the issue of copyright misuse moot. 
 
Further muddying the issue, Justice Fish agreed with the opinion of 
Justice Rothstein, but expressed “grave doubt” as to “whether the 
law governing the protection of intellectual property rights in Canada 
can be transformed in this way into an instrument of trade control not 
contemplated by the Copyright Act.”129 With two groups of justices 
reaching their concurring decisions through widely divergent paths, 
Justice Fish expressing concern over a relatively key matter, and 
McLachlin C.J. and Abella J. standing in dissent, it is difficult to 
extrapolate any clear principles regarding an issue so peripheral to 
the case. While none of the scattered opinions constitute anything 
close to an embrace of the copyright misuse doctrine, it is equally 
inaccurate to conclude that the defence has been soundly rejected. In 
fact, the Court's reasoning seems largely harmonious with copyright 
misuse in many aspects. At most, Euro-Excellence indicates a 
preference on behalf of the Court to refrain from needlessly 
exploring a novel doctrine's application in Canada unless clearly 
warranted in the circumstances. 
 
Part IV: Conclusion 
 
According to one commentator, “[copyright] misuse has now 
reached a stage of development similar to the stage that the fair use 
defense reached before its statutory enactment.”130 As a result, 
American scholars have recently proposed codifying the defence in 
an amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act.131 Other countries are 
considering similar changes. Currently in the process of copyright 
reform, Brazil is evaluating a proposed provision with a purpose 
comparable to that of anti-circumvention misuse. Rather than 
                                                
129 Euro-Excellence, supra note 92 at para 52. 
130 See Tom W Bell, “Codifying Copyright's Misuse Defense” (2007) Utah L Rev 
573 at 574. 
131 See generally Ibid; see also Erkstrand, supra note 11 at 586-589. 
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temporarily barring actions for infringement, however, behaviour 
constituting misuse would lead to actual civil sanctions.132 
 
While statutory reform may offer a more effective, long-term 
solution, the threats posed by overreaching copyright owners are 
urgent and a judicial doctrine of copyright misuse represents a more 
immediate and flexible approach. Given the clear articulation of 
copyright's purpose to have recently emerged from the Supreme 
Court of Canada, a strong justificatory basis now exists for the 
doctrine's importation into Canadian law. Although the exact 
doctrinal scope and function of copyright misuse remain uncertain, 
the need to create a disincentive for overreach and abuse is clear. The 
questionable procedural behaviour of overzealous copyright owners, 
coupled with the increasing use of licensing agreements and 
technological protection measures to control access to expressive 
works, threaten to not only render the statutory limits and safety-
valves of copyright ineffectual, but also to supplant copyright as the 
dominant means of exercising control over expressive works. 
Copyright misuse should be considered as one tool among many 
necessary to avoid such consequences. 
                                                
132 Law No 9610 of 19 February 1998, on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, s 
107(1) (Brazil) [unofficial translation]. 
